CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION						
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	(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)		Alive.	• .	25X1	
Relat	ion Between NII 160, SKB 833, and N	III 380				
and N Russi	the relations an Special Construction Bureau), and N II 380 in Leningrad, when the Germa an words meaning "Scientific Resear the official writte ussian words for "All-Union" in from	III 380. un group rch Inst en desig	first arrived. I itute". In regar- mation of the Ins	were in Fryazi NII stands for d to NII 380, titute also in	no, the	

25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

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A Section 1	Institute was never referred to as the All-Union Scientific	$(s_{\underline{s}_{1}},s_{\underline{s}_{2}}) = s_{\underline{s}_{2}}^{s_{1}} = s_{\underline{s}_{2}}^{s_{2}}$
	Research Institute for Television Development.	25X1
100	it is a general Soviet policy that no title applied to a facility	
	shall reveal the scope of its work program.	
2.	Institute 160 in Fryaging, was engaged	25X1
	Institute 160 in Fryazino, was engaged in the production and development of vacuum tubes (including	20/1
	high vacuum types), iconoscopes, and magnetrons. During this	
400	period, the facilities of this Institute and the Special	
	Construction Bureau were located in the	25 X 1
	same buildings but were quite separate. SKB 833 worked on	20/1
	television developments.	
3.	During the war NII 380 had been moved from Leningrad to some	
	location behind the Urals and when hostilities ceased. the	
	Soviets began to gradually transfer the Institute's equipment	
	back to Leningrad. At first this equipment was placed in a	
	building on Lesnoy Prospect (the street address is between 11	
	and 19) and SKB 833 in Fryazino began to supply the Institute	
	with plans and materials so that the latter could begin parallel	
	development work on television projects. It was found, however,	
٠.	that, at the time this help was being given to NII 380 by SKB 833, the former was not yet at a technological and organizational	
	level to enable it to make full use of this support. Accord-	
	ingly, SKB 833 was first made a branch of NII 380 around the	
	end of 1947 and it was moved to Leningrad in April of 1948.	
	About the time that SKB 833 was declared a branch of NII 380	
	the yearly budget for the SKB was 1.500.000 rubles.	25 X 1
	It was actually a rather small operation.	20/(1
		•
4.	At the beginning of 1949 a new building was assigned to NII 380.	
	This was on Fontanka Street, number 6. By that time the so-	
	called "Secret Department" was occupying the third and fourth	
	floors in the "Lesnoy" Branch while the administrative offices	
	were on the first floor and the civilian television work was being done on the second. When the Fontanka building was	
	obtained, the civil departments began to move there. Rooms that	
	became free in "Lesnoy" were then taken over by the "Secret	
	Department". This move was gradual because much repair work	
	had to be done at Fontanka. the "Secret Depart-	25 X 1
	ment" will eventually completely occupy the "Lesnoy" Branch	20/1
	while civilian television developments will be exclusively	and the second
	performed in Fontanka.	
_		05144
5.	the third and fourth floor operations	25 X 1
	at "Lesnoy" were the heart of the entire Institute. They were	
	closely guarded and no German was ever admitted to them. If	
	any problems came up in the work done in that area, the Soviet engineers came to the Germans. Actually it appeared	file and
	such contacts were few; the Soviets were given	25 X 1
	explicit instructions not to contact the Germans except in	
	the case of extreme emergency or only on complex problems.	
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6.	this "Secret Department" was	25X1
	not responsible to any other Institute. There was, of course,	
	much coordination between this department and the services	
	Navy and Air Force officers going into	
	this area, in order to familiarize themselves with	25X1
	the military equipments being worked on there: MOYSETEV seemed	20/1

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SECRET 25X1 to have complete control of the "Secret Department". 25X1 Further Information on Development of the "Tonne" System at NII 380 During the last few months of operation at Tannwald, after the end of the war, a large number of "Tonne" sets were removed by the Soviets and sent to the USSR. ______ the majority 25X1 of these sets must have gone to MII 380 in Leningrad, because work on the "Tonne" system was being done there 25X1 It is well established that only Soviet components will be employed in further development of the "Tonne" and "Seedorf" equipment. These will not give any advanced capabilities to the equipment; and the use of such equipment will be pretty much the same as that contemplated in Germany. 25X1 the Soviets cannot develop a system using the "Tonne" equipment as a basis which will have an advanced capability. 25X1 One of the factors which will certainly limit the Soviets in their ability to develop new systems will be the quality of their engineering personnel. According to USSR standards, the scientists at NII 380 were capable, but 25X1 the Germans would have rated them "middle class". 25X1 production of equipment items since all facilities are far too

Production Capabilities of NII 380

10. HII 380 could not be used under any circumstances for serial small. It was strictly a development organisation. For instance, the monthly quota for the production of iconoscopes was 30, and to get this many good tubes the Institute had to build eight to ten times that many. Once a set of sweep generators was ordered from NII 380 by an unknown facility. A production run of 100 was planned and they were built over a one-and-onehalf to two-year period. For each of these sweep generators the Institute received 40,000 rubles.

25X1 Further Comments on Development Conferences At regular intervals, about 30 Soviet experts got together at 25X1

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25X1 different places in the Soviet Union to discuss the development of television equipment. On several occasions the group met in Leningrad. Germans were allowed to go to these meetings on only one occasion; this was to a meeting held in Moscow in 1947. These meetings were held for the purpose of coordinating development effort and to set the direction in which further development should go. the group was empowered 25X1 to, and did, go into all new developments in the field. this group had no influence on or connection with, 25X1 production activities except perhaps to weed out obsolete products. 25X1 Moscow-Leningrad Coaxial Cable 14. Regarding the Moscow-Leningrad coaxial cable, 25X1 section from Moscow to Kalinin was finished in early 1952, because in May of that year Soviet engineers in charge of testing the line and making measurements of its electrical characteristics 25X1 entire project was also supposed to be completed by the end The line consisted of two coaxial tubes only and had no telephone pairs. 25X1 The cable is planned for television transmission only, although it could naturally be used for other types of transmissions. All of the terminal equipment for the Moscow-Kalinin section of this line is in place. Among the 25X1 equipment removed from Germany by the Soviets was a great deal of underground coaxial cable which could very easily have

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served as a model for the manufacture of this Soviet cable.